En Madrid (…) solo se podían apreciar inmensas colas para adquirir los periódicos que arrebataban de manos de los vendedores. El reflejo de la vida en la capital es el gran aumento de la población, muy considerable. Un gran número de ella vive de milagro, valga la frase. Nubes de vendedores por todos lados. Cigarrillos, pan y otros artículos de estraperlo. Quien ha vivido en Madrid nota un gran cambio. El nivel de vida es más bajo que en Barcelona. En el conjunto de la población puede apreciarse que su indumentaria es vieja y ajada. Más pobreza que en la ciudad condal. Un gran número de inmigrados de todas las regiones de España, donde no pueden vivir por falta de lo más elemental, se encuentra allí, empleándose en los trabajos más variados.
In Madrid (…) you could only see huge queues to buy the newspapers that were snatched from the vendors’ hands. The reflection of life in the capital is the large increase in the population, very considerable. That many are alive is miracle, for want of a better expression. Crowds of vendors are everywhere. Cigarettes, bread and other black-market items. Anyone who has lived in Madrid notices a great change. The standard of living is lower than in Barcelona. In the population as a whole, it can be seen that their clothing is old and worn. More poverty than in Barcelona. There is a large number of immigrants from all the regions of Spain, where they are unable to live due to a lack of the most basic needs, are found there; they are employed in the most varied tasks.1
This article analyses the day-to-day operation of Auxilio Social (AS – Social Aid), the charitable-assistance institution of the Franco regime founded in 1936 by Mercedes Sanz Bachiller, widow of Onesimo Redondo, and the former Jonsista Javier Martínez de Bedoya. They aimed to emulate the Nazi Winterhilfe they had seen on a trip to Germany. Inspired by Falangist principles of “social justice,” AS was destined to become one of the star social policies of the Franco dictatorship showcasing, as Ángela Cenarro expressed it very graphically, “the smile of the Falange,” the friendliest institution of the regime (Orduña, 1996Orduña, M. (1996) El Auxilio Social (1936-1940). La etapa fundacional y los primeros años. Madrid: Escuela Libre., pp. 24-26; Molinero, 2005Molinero, C. (2005) La captación de las masas. Política social y propaganda en el régimen franquista. Madrid: Cátedra., pp. 26-34; Cenarro, 2005Cenarro Lagunas, Á. (2005) La sonrisa de Falange: Auxilio Social en la Guerra Civil y en la posguerra. Barcelona: Crítica., p. 16). In particular, this text focuses on two of the main AS institutions: the Comedores Infantiles (Children’s Dining Halls), for children and nursing mothers, and the Cocinas de Hermandad (Brotherhood Kitchens), to which those receiving assistance went to collect a porcelain lunch box with a meal, which they later ate at home. It specifically explores the conditions and facilities of the premises in which they were located, as well as their daily operation.
The study concentrates on the Comedores Infantiles and Cocinas de Hermandad in Madrid, one of the cities with the highest levels of poverty and hunger during the immediate postwar period, as shown in the report that opens these pages, written by an anarchist who visited it at that time. It looks at 1939 and 1940, the two years with the largest number of active AS Comedores Infantiles and Cocinas de Hermandad, together with 1941. From that year on, the number of people assisted was drastically reduced throughout Spain. The reasons had nothing to do with the eradication of hunger but with the inability to cope with the Obra (“the Work,” i.e. Auxilio Social), which had become overwhelmed. Thus, paradoxically, in one of the worst years of the famine, 1946, Auxilio Social was already much less active (Jiménez, 2020Jiménez, F. (2020) “No son unos comedores más. Auxilio Social, biopolítica y hambre en el primer franquismo.” In: M. Á. Del Arco, ed., Los años del hambre. Historia y memoria de la posguerra franquista. Madrid: Marcial Pons, pp. 195-218., pp. 200-202).
The article focuses on mothers and, above all, on needy children, many of them orphaned or abandoned after the Civil War, whom Ángela Cenarro referred to as the “children of poverty” (Cenarro, 2009Cenarro Lagunas, Á. (2009) Los niños del Auxilio Social. Barcelona: Espasa.). This sector of society, despite being one of the most vulnerable and most affected by the famine of the 1940s, has received little historiographic attention (Cenarro, 2013Cenarro Lagunas, Á. (2013) “Los niños del Auxilio Social. Historia, memoria e identidades.” Historia Social, 76, pp. 145-163.; González de Tena, 2010González de Tena, F. (2010) Niños invisibles en el cuarto Oscuro: Experiencias en el Auxilio Social del franquismo. Madrid: Tébar Flores.; Pérez, 2009Pérez Segura, F. (2009) “La educación de los niños y niñas acogidos en los hogares de Auxilio Social y Diputación (1940-1970).” In: M. R. Berruezo and S. Conejero, eds., El largo camino hacia una educación inclusiva. Pamplona: Universidad Pública de Navarra, Vol. 2, pp. 299-310.). However, it is no coincidence that the first premises opened by Auxilio Social – at that time known as Auxilio de Invierno (Winter Aid) – was a Comedor Infantil for children under twelve. It took place on 30 October 1936 on Calle Angustias in Valladolid, in the rebel rearguard. As was the case in contemporary states in contexts of food crisis (De Zwarte, 2016De Zwarte, I. (2016) “Save the children. Social Self-Organization and Relief in Amsterdam during the Dutch Hunger Winter, 1944-45.” Food & History, 14/2-3, pp. 51-76. doi: 10.1484/j.food.5.115334, p. 63), the Francoist regime prioritised feeding children during the years of hunger (1939-1952), as they were considered the future of the “New Spain.”
The main objective of the study is to assess to what extent these charitable aid institutions failed in their objective to feed the hungry, as well as to explore the reasons for that ineffectiveness. Secondly, the article questions the impact of the malfunctioning of the Auxilio Social Comedores and Cocinas on the popular perception of the Falangist institution.
To achieve its objectives this article uses hitherto unexplored sources: the inspection reports for Auxilio Social Comedores Infantiles and Cocinas de Hermandad that are available in the Archivo General de la Administración. This internal documentation offers an interesting and innovative view of the daily operation of falangist AS Comedores and Cocinas. The reports were written by the various national inspectors (such as Pablo Pérez Velázquez, Juan José Ramírez Fernández-Blanco, Juan Martí, and María Luisa Manterola) and addressed to the comrade chief inspector of the Central Department of Auxilio de Invierno, from whom they had received the order and instructions to proceed with the inspection visits. They all ended their letters with the Falangist slogan: “For God, for Spain and its national-syndicalist revolution.” This type of inspection visit was common in other Falangist organisations, such as the provincial delegations of Sección Femenina and FET de las JONS. The Provincial Inspection reports of the single party were aimed at renewing local positions (Ginés, 2016Ginés i Sànchez, A. (2016) “Les comarques de Castelló sota el rigor falangista de José Andino Núñez (1941-1946). Una aproximación a partir dels informes de la Inspecció Provincial de FET y de las JONS.” Franquisme & Transició, 4, pp. 41-87. doi: 10.7238/fit.v0i4.2935). However, the internal inspections in the AS Comedores and Cocinas can be interpreted as a novel feature of modernity in the concept of Falangist welfare concerning traditional Catholic socio-charitable assistance (Blasco, 2005Blasco Herranz, I. (2005) “Sección Femenina y Acción Católica: la movilización de las mujeres durante el franquismo.” Gerónimo de Uztariz, 21, pp. 55-66.). We do not know whether the inspections were systematic, whether they existed in other regions, or how long they were maintained over time.
Like other authoritarian regimes, such as Mussolini’s (Corner, 2022), Francoism promoted a series of social policies that in recent decades have gone from being ignored to being increasingly addressed by historiography (Molinero, 2003Molinero, C. (2003) “La política social del régimen franquista. Una asignatura pendiente de la historiografía.” Ayer, 50, pp. 319-331.; Lanero, 2013Lanero, D. (2013) “Las políticas sociales del franquismo. Las obras sindicales.” In: M. Á. Del Arco, ed., No solo miedo. Actitudes políticas y opinión popular bajo la dictadura franquista (1936-1977). Granada: Comares, pp. 127-142.). More recent research on the subject has begun to interrogate how these policies were received among the population, assessing their potential to improve popular perceptions of the regime (González and Ortiz, 2017González, D. A. and Ortiz, M. (2017) “La dictadura de la miseria. Políticas sociales y actitudes de los españoles en el primer franquismo.” Historia Social, 88, pp. 25-46.; Fuertes, 2017Fuertes, C. (2017) Viviendo en dictadura. La evolución de las actitudes sociales hacia el franquismo. Granada: Comares.). In the post-war years, one of the most important social policies of the dictatorship was the welfare policies channelled through Auxilio Social. This research is based on pioneering studies of that Falangist institution, such as those of Pedro Carasa (1997Carasa, P. (1997) “La revolución nacional-asistencial durante el primer franquismo (1936-1940).” Historia Contemporánea, 16, pp. 89-142.), who spoke of a true “national-welfare revolution.” It follows in the footsteps of previous social history studies interested in popular perceptions of AS, such as those by Ángela Cenarro (2008Cenarro Lagunas, Á. (2008) “Memories of Repression and Resistance: Narratives of Children Institutionalized by Auxilio Social in Postwar Spain.” History and Memory, 2 (20), pp. 39-59. doi: 10.2979/his.2008.20.2.39), who focused her work on the testimonies and individual subjectivities of those who had passed through AS, which allowed her to explore issues such as “narratives of resistance.”2
In the first section, the article focuses on the terrible condition of the premises in which the Comedores Infantiles and the Cocinas de Hermandad were located, while the second looks at the mismanagement of these Auxilio Social institutions. The conclusion is reached that possession of the card that gave access to these charitable assistance premises did not guarantee a plate of hot food, nor did it protect those assisted from exposure to cold and illness. Likewise, the idea is defended that, given the terrible conditions and poor management of the AS Comedores and Cocinas—together with the equally poor state of the rationing system—the mothers and children of the lower classes were forced to engage in economic crime (Agustí, 2010Agustí, C. (2010) “Golfillos de la calle. Menores, marginación y control social durante el primer franquismo a través de los expedientes del Tribunal Tutelar de Menores de Lleida.” In: C. Navajas, and D. Iturriaga, eds., Novísima: II Congreso Internacional de Historia de Nuestro Tiempo. Logroño: Universidad de La Rioja, pp. 309-322.; Rodríguez, 2011Rodríguez Barreira, Ó. J. (2011) “Auxilio Social y las actitudes cotidianas en los Años del Hambre, 1937-1943.” Historia del presente, 17, pp. 127-147. doi: 10.5944/hdp.17.2011.40874). This was especially true after 1941, when many Comedores and Cocinas began to be dismantled, at a time when some of the worst years of the famine were still to come (Del Arco and Anderson, 2021Del Arco Blanco, M. Á., and Anderson, P. (2021) “Introduction: Famine not Hunger?” In: M. Á. Del Arco Blanco and P. Anderson, eds., Franco’s famine. Malnutrition, Disease and Starvation in Post-Civil War Spain. London: Bloomsbury, pp. 1-18.). Moreover, inspection reports reveal that, like other organisations of the regime in the post-war years, AS was affected by serious corruption problems that harmed its functioning. Although the staff of these AS institutions blamed their ineffectiveness on food shortages, the truth is that this problem was considerably exacerbated by the mismanagement of the meagre supplies that were received, much of which were diverted and/or stolen by the employees. Finally, it is concluded that the reality of the Comedores and Cocinas was far from that spread by the regime: the premises were neither like those designed by the architects, nor did they serve all the food announced on the official menus. For all these reasons, it is argued that the popular perception of this social policy of the dictatorship was negatively affected.
“A TRULY SAD PICTURE.” THE HARSH REALITY OF THE AUXILIO SOCIAL COCINAS DE HERMANDAD AND COMEDORES INFANTILES
⌅Va como todas las mañanas con la tartera a la cola del Auxilio Social. Y como todas las mañanas la sube a casa y, sin esperar a la hora de la comida, come con ansia su parte. El pan se lo guarda en el bolsillo (...) Sale a la calle que bulle como siempre con mujeres de negro que suben y bajan cargadas tras comprar y vender cachivaches en los puestos del Rastro.
As every morning he goes with his lunch box to the Auxilio Social queue. And, as every morning, he takes it home and, without waiting for lunch, he eagerly eats his part. He puts the bread in her pocket (...) He goes out into the street, which is bustling as always with women in black who go up and down laden after buying and selling knickknacks at the Rastro stalls.
(Lindo, 2020Lindo, E. (2020) A corazón abierto. Barcelona: Seix Barral., p. 373).
Auxilio Social aimed to feed the needy but also to indoctrinate them (Cenarro, 2005Cenarro Lagunas, Á. (2005) La sonrisa de Falange: Auxilio Social en la Guerra Civil y en la posguerra. Barcelona: Crítica.), while at the same time seeking to improve the dictatorship’s image among the population. The first of these aims failed disastrously, to the detriment of the other two. The reality of the Auxilio Social Comedores Infantiles and Cocinas de Hermandad in Madrid was far from the idyllic image of this charitable welfare institution the regime tried to project through its propaganda (Giménez-Muñoz, 2009Giménez-Muñoz, M. C. (2009) “La asistencia social en Sevilla. Del Auxilio de Invierno al Auxilio Social (1936-1939).” Hispania Nova, 9, s/p.).3
AS’ failure to feed those it was set up to help limited its potential to indoctrinate and socially control them (Cenarro, 2005Cenarro Lagunas, Á. (2005) La sonrisa de Falange: Auxilio Social en la Guerra Civil y en la posguerra. Barcelona: Crítica., pp. 67-68). This post-war social policy was set up by the regime in the hope of attracting children, the “future supports of the country.” However, as the testimonies of those who spent their childhoods eating at its feeding centres reveal, it would have reaped little success (Cenarro, 2009Cenarro Lagunas, Á. (2009) Los niños del Auxilio Social. Barcelona: Espasa.; Giménez, 2012Giménez, C. (2012) Paracuellos. Barcelona: Debolsillo.). The limits of AS’ proselytising efforts can also be deduced from the reports of the inspectors of Comedores and Cocinas. Some were concerned about staff who had not been purged and therefore might not be ideologically sympathetic. Others insisted on remedying the lack of regime symbols on AS premises, such as the Comedor Infantil in Tabernillas, which lacked “decoration with items that recall the atmosphere of our Work;”4
Given that the Obra did not manage to feed all the needy and had to close many of the Comedores and Cocinas from 1941 onwards, it would hardly have achieved its third objective, that of convincing the population of the regime’s magnanimity. Despite the propaganda efforts, its actions - corrupt and insufficient - did not serve to build loyalty outside its usual target group or to generate an “active consensus” (Saz, 1999Saz, I. (1999) “Introducción.” In: I. Saz, and J. A. Gómez Roda, eds., El franquismo en Valencia. Formas de vida y actitudes sociales en la posguerra. Valencia: Episteme, pp. 117-158.). In fact, they even caused small daily acts of resistance, such as the refusal to wear the institution’s emblem on their lapels on collection days (Román, 2020bRomán Ruiz, G. (2020b) Franquismo de carne y hueso. Entre el consentimiento y las resistencias cotidianas (1939-1975). Valencia: PUV, 2020., pp. 115-117). It is true that, although the inspectors of the canteens and kitchens in Madrid in 1939 and 1940 conveyed an eminently negative image of the functioning of these institutions, they also received some signs of sympathy towards Auxilio Social. For example, on such a symbolic date as Christmas Day 1939—the first after the Civil War—during one of the food distributions at the Cocina de Cervantes, “the people in the queue cheered the Caudillo and Auxilio Social.” However, this apparently spontaneous and enthusiastic expression does not seem to have been one of sincere gratitude. Considering that the food was being served without oil that day, it seems more likely to have been a strategy aimed at capturing the benevolence of those who controlled the food in this Falangist institution.7
“SO MANY RATS WALKING ALL OVER THE BREAD.” THE TERRIBLE CONDITIONS OF THE PREMISES
⌅La impresión sacada de este comedor es que dista mucho de ser lo que anhelamos.
The impression taken from this Comedor is that it is far from what we hope for.8
In 1941, several architects from the Auxilio Social technical office designed a Comedor Infantil and a Cocina de Hermandad in El Pardo, very close to the Palace in which Francisco Franco lived. The project included a dining room for sixty children of both sexes, a pantry and grocery store, and a room for the distribution of food rations with a “bread drawer,” a “waiting area for those waiting for assistance” and a “bench” for them to sit on. The kitchen included a fireplace, a coal cellar, a woodshed, a preparation table, a “double sink for washing vegetables and fish,” a “double sink for kitchenware and crockery” and a “cabinet-table for crockery and table linen.” Among other issues, the provision of ventilation and sufficient light to all these spaces was taken into account, “given the hygienic and, at the same time, pleasant nature corresponding to the institution” (Arquitectos de la Oficina Técnica de Auxilio Social, 1941Arquitectos de la Oficina Técnica de Auxilio Social (1941) “Comedor infantil y cocina de hermandad en el Pardo.” Revista Nacional de Arquitectura, 2, pp. 63-64.).
However, the reality of the premises eventually used for the Auxilio Social Comedores Infantiles (Children’s Dining Halls) and Cocinas de Hermandad (Brotherhood Kitchens) in Madrid in the immediate postwar period bore little resemblance to this architectural plan. Neither did they resemble the idyllic image disseminated by the Francoist propaganda. The premises rarely met the minimum conditions required to host a charitable aid type of institution. Some inspectors considered some of them to be downright “disreputable” or to have a “repellent” appearance. The facilities were completely unfit for the purpose they were intended to serve. Some were in basements or in “garages with a central courtyard and covered sheds,” as was the case of the Cocina de Hermandad at 40 Marqués de Zafra Street. At Number 10 the situation was even worse: the kitchen was so small that the food had to be prepared in the garden, where there was not even “a shed to protect either the staff who worked there or those being served from inclement weather.”9
Others were clearly unsuitable for those they were trying to help, as in the case of one that could only be reached by an “endless staircase” and entailed, according to one inspector’s report, a serious risk of falling for the smallest children. Furthermore, most of the premises were 'unsightly’. Many of the Comedores did not even have tablecloths, which, in the opinion of the inspectors gave them a “very ugly” and neglected appearance. One such inspector said the Comedor reminded her of “an asylum,” something that in her opinion did not favour the purposes of Auxilio Social at all, probably about the poor image it projected.10
All these challenges were in addition to the fact that many premises were too small for the number of people they had to attend to, given the sharp fall in the population’s purchasing power after the Civil War, which was further aggravated by the autarky (Ortega and Cobo, 2004Ortega López, T. M., and Cobo Romero, F. (2004) “Hambre, desempleo y emigración. Las consecuencias sociales de la política agraria autárquica en Andalucía oriental, 1939-1975.” Hispania, 64/218, pp. 1079-1112. doi: 10.3989/hispania.2004.v64.i218.180). In the one on Ramón y Cajal Street, for example, the children were “truly crowded to the point of eating nine at each table.” In others, the cold was “so intense” that most of the children fell ill and had to stay at home with bronchitis or colds, which led to the closure of the Comedores. Or they were “unhealthy” due to the total lack of ventilation and sunlight, as well as dampness, which led to terrible conditions for storing food that would subsequently go bad. This was what happened in the central warehouse of the Congress District in December 1939 with 50 kg of powdered milk, which ended up being used as sawdust, and more than 1,500 tins of condensed milk that had spoiled due to the damp and the heat.11
This shocking lack of hygiene meant rodents were abundant, with the consequent danger to the health of the assisted persons, who were exposed to animal-borne diseases. Many inspectors denounced the large number of rats that could be seen, even in broad daylight, in the Cocinas de Hermandad and Comedores Infantiles of Madrid. At 1 Concepción Arenal Street, where breastfeeding mothers were also given food, there was said to be a “tremendous invasion” of these rodents, which was evident given the conditions in which the bread was found. In Cocina de Hermandad No. 4 in the Congress district, which was located on a plot, “the rats walk through the loaves of bread, bread that is eaten, and when there are legumes in the warehouse, they also devour them.” According to the inspector who denounced this situation in her report, “the profusion of rats that surrounds it [the premises] causes true anguish.” The problem was difficult to solve since, as they were Comedores and Cocinas, poisons could not be used due to the high risk of contaminating the food.14
Another important problem faced by the AS Cocinas de Hermandad and Comedores Infantiles was the lack of furniture. Many of the premises, like the one in Marqués de Zafra Street, did not even have tables and chairs for the children. And, worse still, they lacked the basic utensils for preparing and serving the meals, as well as eating them. For example, in the Comedor Infantil in Ramón y Cajal Street, also located on a plot, there was no “furniture of any kind or utensils, only the cauldrons.” Many chefs complained about the lack of saucepans in good condition and about being forced to cook in pots that had lost their tin coating or were covered in verdigris, which were hazardous due to the risk of poisoning they supposed. Part of the kitchenware was unusable because it was outdated or rusty, as in the case of the Comedor Infantil on Abada Street, in the basement of the Palacio de la Música, or the Cocina de Hermandad on Cervantes Street.15
Me fue dolorosísimo ver que un niño que padecía conjuntivitis ofrecía su taza, después de haber bebido él en ella, al niño próximo para que saciara su sed en el mismo cacharro.
It was very painful for me to see how a child suffering from conjunctivitis offered their cup, after having drunk from it, to the next child to satisfy their thirst from the same vessel.17
The lack of material means we can add that of human resources. This shortage of staff translated into an exasperating slowness when preparing and serving meals, which in turn limited the total number of potential attendees. This is what happened in O’Donnell Street Cocina de Hermandad, especially when they had to carry out such time-consuming tasks as selecting chickpeas or peeling potatoes. The problem also affected controlling access to the premises. In the Concepción Arenal Comedor Infantil it took the children more than an hour to get in because there was only one person at the entrance in charge of perforating the punch cards. According to the inspector, the ideal number for organising and accelerating access would have been at least four performing the task, one per line. Some delegates from the Cocinas and Comedores complained that so few comrades were sent to carry out their Servicio Social (SS-Social Service) at these institutions, as they constituted essentially free labour for the functioning of AS (Rebollo, 1999Rebollo, P (1999) “El Servicio Social de la mujer de Sección Femenina de Falange. Su implantación en el medio rural.” In: M. Á. Ruiz Carnicer, and C. Frías Corredor, eds., Nuevas tendencias historiográficas e historia local en España. Actas del II Congreso de Historia Local de Aragón. Zaragoza: Universidad de Zaragoza, pp. 311-313.; Sánchez, 2013Sánchez Blanco, L. (2013) “El boletín de Auxilio Social. La formación de las mujeres que trabajaban en el Servicio Social (1937-1939).” Papeles Salmantinos de Educación, 17, pp. 101-120.). It is possible that behind this lack of women “managers of misery” (Rodríguez, 2005Rodríguez, S. (2005) “La Sección Femenina de FET-JONS: Paños calientes para una dictadura.” Arenal, 12/1, pp. 35-60., p. 39) was the struggle between AS and Sección Femenina for control of the SS.
“CAN THIS BE CALLED FEEDING THE NEEDY?” THE ABYSMAL FUNCTIONING OF THE AUXILIO SOCIAL, COCINAS AND COMEDORES
⌅La comida que reciben los menesterosos es (el día que la tienen) insuficiente y malísima.
The food that the needy receive (when they actually get it) is insufficient and of very poor quality.18
The few people employed in the Comedores and Cocinas were not always the most suitable for carrying out the work entrusted to them, as many came to Auxilio Social for instrumental, not ideological, purposes. At times, those in charge were intransigent and despotic, an attitude that did not fit in with the spirit of the Obra (Auxilio Social), which had a special interest in assisting the “defeated” to attract them to their cause (Molinero, 2005Molinero, C. (2005) La captación de las masas. Política social y propaganda en el régimen franquista. Madrid: Cátedra., p. 29; Cenarro, 2005Cenarro Lagunas, Á. (2005) La sonrisa de Falange: Auxilio Social en la Guerra Civil y en la posguerra. Barcelona: Crítica., pp. 131-132). A good example of this was the head of the Cervantes Cocina, who was described as being “quite violent” with both employees and those they were assisting. Apparently, one day at the beginning of November 1939, he addressed the door attendant who was trying to organise access to the Comedor in the following terms: “Be firm with those in the queues, they’re all reds.”19
Estas niñas deben ser expulsadas de nuestros Comedores por no venir más que a estropear nuestra labor. Adjunto envío relación de las que se portan bien y de las que se portan mal. Mi visita por la noche resulta provechosísima pues nunca esperan que a esta hora vaya nadie y se ven sorprendidas en muchas cosas que podré exponer verbalmente algún día.
These girls should be expelled from our Comedores as they only come to spoil our work. I am enclosing a list of those who behave well and those who behave badly. My visit at night is extremely useful because they never expect anyone to come at that time and they are surprised while doing many things that I will be able to explain verbally one day.22
This widespread staff apathy was often blamed on their “political status,” given that many Comedores and Cocinas had not yet been purged. Moreover, many women worked in AS in order to atone for the sins of their left-wing family members (Prada, 2002Prada Rodríguez, J. (2002) “Que es redención dinámica del dolor, del frío, del hambre y de la miseria: Auxilio Social en Ourense (1936-1940).” Minius. Revista do Departamento de Historia, Arte e Xeografía, 10, pp. 183-208., p. 207). This is what happened in the one located at 40 Marqués de Zafra Street, where the manager expressed his doubts about the “condition” of the employees because they gave the attendees more food than stipulated, as a result of which he had to keep them under constant surveillance. In the Comedor on Ramón y Cajal Street, the situation appeared to be even more serious. According to the delegate, some of the comrades who were undertaking their Social Service there did not treat the children with due cordiality because they were “red,” like V.H., who had worked for International Red Aid.23
One of the main problems that burdened the operation of the AS Cocinas and Comedores was the difficulty in supplying food, due both to the general shortages of the postwar years and the Falangist institution’s lack of financing. It was financed basically from fortnightly collections, private monthly donations such as the Ficha Azul (Blue Card), and voluntary “taxes” such as the “Day of Only One Course” or the “Day Without Dessert.” However, all the AS delegations encountered resistance when collecting these fees and many did not pay (Prada, 2002Prada Rodríguez, J. (2002) “Que es redención dinámica del dolor, del frío, del hambre y de la miseria: Auxilio Social en Ourense (1936-1940).” Minius. Revista do Departamento de Historia, Arte e Xeografía, 10, pp. 183-208., pp. 195-196; Guerra, 2006Guerra Palmero, R. A. (2006) “La beneficencia franquista: Auxilio Social y el Mando Económico. Entre la caridad y la propaganda (1936-1946).” In: F. Morales, ed., XVI Coloquio de Historia Canario-Americana. Las Palmas de Gran Canaria: Cabildo Insular de Gran Canaria, pp. 942-962., p. 947). Mainly due to this lack of funds, the food that arrived was less than that needed and, furthermore, it often came late and in poor condition. The inspectors insisted in their reports that the food received by these institutions was “nowhere near sufficient” and in “extremely small” quantities, considering the number of portions they had to serve. For example, Cocina de Hermandad No. 2 in the centre of Madrid faced this obstacle, despite having a “duty-conscious” chef. In October 1939, the O’Donnell Street Cocina de Hermandad went for “several days without salt” and that of Marqués de Zafra Street was also unable to obtain any.28
In addition, when it finally arrived, much of the food was in poor condition. The bread used to arrive underweight and of “infernal quality,” as was the case with the bread served by the bakery on Madera Street, which sent it hard, full of pieces of charcoal and gnawed by rats.33
However, in addition to the difficulties involved in the supply of food, there was an even more serious problem: widespread corruption in the feeding centres. The string of malpractices in the Auxilio Social canteens reinforces the idea that the severity of the post-war famine was not so much due to the lack of foodstuffs as to the appalling management of what was available. As various authors have argued, during the early Franco regime, institutional corruption became a structural problem during the dictatorship, even though it presented itself as a tireless persecutor of fraud (Barciela, 1998Barciela, C. (1998) “Franquismo y corrupción económica.” Historia Social, 30, pp. 83-96.; Cazorla, 2009Cazorla Sánchez, A. (2009) Fear and Progress: Ordinary lives in Franco’s Spain (1939-1975). Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons., p. 35; Muñoz, 2016Muñoz Jofre, J. (2016) La España corrupta: breve historia de la corrupción (de la Restauración a nuestros días, 1875-2016). Granada: Comares, 2016., pp. 69-77; Del Arco, 2018Del Arco Blanco, M. Á. (2018) “La corrupción en el franquismo. El fenómeno del gran estraperlo.” Hispania Nova, 16, pp. 620-645. doi: 10.20318/hn.2018.4050; Román, 2020aRomán Ruiz, G. (2020a) “El negocio del hambre. Fraude y corrupción durante la posguerra autárquica en el campo alto-andaluz.” Historia Contemporánea, 63, pp. 663-691. doi: 10.1387/hc.20189). AS was no exception in this regard. Despite internal inspections, corruption affected practically all the delegations, not only Madrid.38
Irregularities were favoured by the climate of corruption that characterised the post-war period, shortages, and the expansion of the black market. The workers themselves could indeed have had family needs to cover in the years marked by the population’s loss of purchasing power and the generalisation of poverty. Very few received a salary since most of the workforce was based on unpaid social service. Furthermore, there were “big differences” between some Comedores Infantiles and others.39
The inspections revealed discrepancies between the quantities of food reflected in the record books and those available in the warehouse. This was because everything that escaped official control could be used by the staff, who either consumed it in the kitchen or took it to eat at home or sell on the black market. Hence, the heads of Comedores and Cocinas stopped registering the most succulent items or recorded them in lower amounts, which is what the central warehouse in the Congress district did with milk flour. That is why many refused to show the inventory when required to do so. Another of their strategies to divert food was to not give certain items with the first cards but to begin with the higher numbers, as the O’Donnell Street Cocina delegate did with the tins of tuna. Although they claimed to have distributed the five hundred they received, the truth is that only the holders of cards 74 to 500 received a tin, thus allowing the staff to syphon off 73 tins.40
The worst thing of all, given that they were obliged to use everything they were supplied with daily, the staff often used to divert the best food supplied to the Comedor and reserve it for themselves, thus depriving the children for whom it was intended. This was the case with meat that, in the post-war years, became a luxury item absent from the diet of the working classes (Gracia Arnáiz, 2002Gracia Arnaiz, M. (2002) “Sobre l’abséncia i la preséncia de carn a les cuines populars de Barcelona: entre la postguerra i els nostres diez.” Revista d’etnologia de Catalunya, 20, pp. 142-161.) and therefore a particularly coveted item for those who worked in Auxilio Social. In the Cervantes Cocina de Hermandad, for example, the tins of meat in the sauce were shared between the cook, the delegate, and the accountant. And in that of Mariana Pineda, an open 500-gram tin of clams was found that, instead of being added to the pot, had been reserved for the consumption of the staff. The same happened in Cocina No. 3, where the meat and tuna sent for nursing mothers, for whom the highest protein food was destined, was insufficient because part of it had been diverted to the kitchen employees.41
Although the Comedor and Cocina employees were not allowed to prepare food separately for themselves, the inspectors constantly surprised them by doing so. On 13 December 1939, for example, “a pot of very well-cooked potatoes” for the staff was found in the oven of the O’Donnell Street Cocina de Hermandad. In another of the Cocinas on the same street, the delegate acknowledged giving food and bread to the staff because he did not have the “heart” to deny it to them.43
On other occasions, the Comedor staff took the food home, either for their own families to eat or to sell on the black market. This was verified by the inspector in charge of visiting Cocina No. 4 in the Congress district, where she saw several employees stealing “a large amount of bread.”46
The mismanagement of the AS institutions and the incompetence of their staff bordered on the grotesque. In Cocinas de Hermandad like the one on Cervantes Street, food was wasted because they did not decide to “use it.” This happened with 396 kilos of tomato in jars that rotted in the warehouse as they were not used quickly enough, at the same time as there were daily shortages of food for the attendees in need.49
The problems in the supplies of food to the Comedores Infantiles and Cocinas de Hermandad, together with their shockingly poor management by those in charge, translated into a manifest inability to prepare and serve all the necessary meals. On most days these AS institutions were unable to attend to all the needy assigned to them. Many of the children who queued for hours at the entrances to the Comedores in the hope of being given a plate of food had to leave with empty stomachs. At the O’Donnell Street Cocina, the food distributed in August 1939 did not reach even half of those with an AS card.50
The poor operation of the Comedores Infantiles and Cocinas de Hermandad not only affected the number of portions served but also their size. Therefore, even the children who managed to get into the Comedores were not able to leave with relatively full stomachs, as what they were served was nowhere near enough to appease their hunger. In the Marqués de Zafra Cocina, for instance, the staff ended up serving “one ladle for every two children.”54
Una sardina y 250 gramos de pan por persona en la segunda tanda, y en la primera se les ha dado un cacillo pequeñísimo de lentejas en lugar de la sardina (…) Una sardina cruda y un pedazo de pan para alimentarse durante 24 horas es algo que se comenta solo. ¿Puede llamarse esto dar de comer al menesteroso?
A sardine and 250 grams of bread per person in the second batch, and in the first they were given a tiny scoop of lentils instead of the sardine (…) A raw sardine and a piece of bread to eat for 24 hours speaks for itself. Can this be called feeding the needy?58
But not only were the quantities ridiculously small but also the quality of the food served to the children in these institutions cried out to heaven. A common denominator among the AS Cocinas and Comedores of Madrid in the immediate post-war period was that they prepared meals without cooking oil or any other type of fat. Many of these facilities went for days or even weeks without receiving any olive oil, one of the star products of the postwar black market and one of those that saw the greatest increase in price due to its scarcity (Christiansen, 2002Christiansen, T. (2002) “Intervención del Estado y mercado negro en el sector oleícola durante el primer franquismo.” Historia Agraria, 27, pp. 221-246.). In their reports, the inspectors repeatedly insisted on how “very badly seasoned” the meals served were. The chickpeas, potatoes, lentils, chard, and meat that made up the daily menus were prepared without a drop of oil.59
In addition to meals cooked without oil or served cold, the children attended to by Auxilio Social had to eat all kinds of preparations that were unappetising, if not despicable. Some bore little or no resemblance to the officially distributed menu, such as the small amount of “dirty liquid” served in Congress district Cocina No. 4 in August 1939, instead of the beans and beef announced for that day. Meals were often served “with an excess of broth,” as happened on 28 October 1939 with the stewed potatoes and pickled tuna in the Marqués de Zafra Comedor.66
Many of these indescribable preparations compromised the already diminished health of those being assisted. This was the case of the sardines served in the Comedor Infantil on Abada Street, which contained “such a high amount of salt [perhaps to hide their poor quality or condition] that it is frightening to think of the effect this will have on the developing stomach of a child.”70
Despite the insufficiency and atrocious quality of the meals served, many children were so hungry that they resorted to trickery to obtain food from the Auxilio Social Comedores and Cocinas. Some altered the number of portions shown on their AS cards, especially in cases where, due to the lack of tickets, they were given “a small piece of paper” with the stamp of the district on which it was very easy to modify this number.73
CONCLUSIONS. NEITHER FED NOR INDOCTRINATED NOR SEDUCED
⌅In the light of the terrible daily reality of the Comedores Infantiles and Cocinas de Hermandad revealed by the inspection reports from Madrid during the immediate post-war period, Auxilio Social failed in its triple objective of feeding hungry mothers and children, indoctrinating them and improving the image of the regime. As the inspection visits show, the limitations of this Francoist social policy were largely due to the corrupt practices of the people who operated it.
Firstly, AS failed to feed the needy. The daily reality of the Comedores and Cocinas belies the official figures on the number of people attended to daily, as well as the quantity and quality of food distributed. On most days neither the Comedores Infantiles nor the Cocinas de Hermandad were able to attend to all the needy who had cards issued by AS. And those who were lucky enough to be served meals were given ridiculously small, poor-quality rations that included food served without oil, watered down, cold, or even spoiled. All this placed the already poor health of the assisted mothers and children at even greater risk; not only were they unable to stave off their hunger but they were also exposed to contagion and food poisoning. The premises that housed these institutions did not meet the minimum conditions of space, hygiene, or health. Many were in basements; most were infested with rats; and others were so cold that the children became ill. They all shared the problem of a lack of personnel, furniture, and, above all, kitchen implements and utensils with which to prepare and serve the meals. To this can be added the disastrous functioning of these institutions, which fell far short of providing adequate food for those they were set up to help. Many of the difficulties were indeed due to problems in receiving supplies of basic provisions. However, these circumstances do not by themselves explain the poor performance of these AS institutions. To understand this, we also have to take into account the apathetic attitude of many of the staff, who rarely had any real motivation to be there, beyond easy access to food. And, above all, their terrible management of the scarce resources available, since irregularities and corruption were daily occurrences in these institutions. In years of hunger and the black market, the Comedores and Cocinas staff constantly stole or diverted food by different methods for their personal consumption or to sell on the black market. Likewise, although it was strictly forbidden, the employees prepared separate meals for themselves, reserving the best food for this. This in turn reveals that, despite the inspectors’ concern about these corrupt practices, inspections were not effective in preventing or eradicating them.
Secondly, AS’ failure to adequately nourish those assisted would have undermined the second of its objectives, that of indoctrinating them. On the one hand, this was because the number of children attended did not reach the expected numbers due to the lack of capacity of the canteens and kitchens to absorb them. On the other hand, as these feeding centres were forced to close sooner than expected, the time available to inculcate the children with Francoist ideology was drastically reduced. And, above all, because it would have been difficult to convince those in need of help of the beneficence of the new regime if it were not even capable of providing them with a hot meal.
Finally, AS would not have succeeded in reinforcing the acquiescent attitudes of the Madrid population (neither assisted nor non-assisted) or in reducing hostility towards the dictatorship. Judging by its abysmal day-to-day functioning, the Falangist welfare system in the capital would not have served to attract new loyalties to the cause of the “New Spain,” self-represented as charitable and magnanimous. Despite propaganda attempts to present it as a tool to alleviate the poverty of the menesterosos (needy), Franco’s social policy did not achieve the expected success, either in the charitable or political sphere.