The Cold War in MexicoTop

The transformation of the US into a superpower was the most momentous change affecting Mexico in the post-War period. A century after the 1847 war, the significant asymmetries that in the past were already significant in 1946 became incomparable. In terms of population alone, in that year Mexico had a population of 23 million; the United States had 145 million and was the world’s leading industrial, economic and military power. Its size, geographical proximity and its offensive capabilities represented a threat to Mexico, whose government lived in constant apprehension of its neighbor’s propensity to intervene in the domestic politics of other countries. The cold war accentuated this proclivity.

The cold war was a global phenomenon that in each country took the features of the local environment (Fein, 2008: 204). In Mexico it gave rise to a powerful conservative atmosphere in a context of rapid social change, population growth, weak institutions and pronounced social inequalities. These processes and the tensions of a world that seemed to be on the verge of a nuclear war justified the concentration of power and the centralization of decision-making processes. Thus, the international context contributed to the authoritarian regime’s consolidation. Three fundamental pieces shaped the political system: a centralized State, the presidency and the PRI. The hegemonic party was the main instrument of political control and the pillar of an extended clientelistic structure, that was central to the “diffuse support” many Mexicans gave their political system (Coleman, 1976). This system discouraged political participation because stability rested mostly on conformity, controlled participation and repression.

In Mexico, the international context antagonism between Liberal Democracy and Totalitarian Communism was juxtaposed with existing political divisions namely the political fracture that separated cardenistas and anti-cardenistas. The cold war became the framework of reference for the Communist Party and for the Catholic Church. It redefined their position in the political system and the terms of the political debate, and it altered the balance of power. This framework helped the post-war Presidents undermine the cardenista coalition that up until 1948 included peasants’ and labor organizations that remained loyal to cardenismo, and a significant segment of the intellectual, elite and of the middle classes. It also included a current of the PRI represented by Vicente Lombardo Toledano, a successful union leader. In 1936 Lombardo founded the powerful Confederación de Trabajadores de México, CTM, Confederación de Trabajadores de América Latina, CTAL, that in 1945 represented 300 thousand workers.

In the bipolar world, the ascent of the US was also felt in the realm of culture and ideas. In Mexico it gradually became predominant at the expense of the European influence that until the Second World War had been a protecting shield against US overwhelming power. Many Mexicans resented this influence. PRI ideologues conceived a nationalist doctrine intended to resist the appeal of US mass culture, solidify the Mexican identity, and foster traditional values. The nationalist doctrine was also meant to give ideological support to the regime. Inevitably, it had a significant component of anti-US attitudes that could easily turn into anti-Imperialistic manifestations, and often it carried a reflex reaction to side with the US adversaries. Therefore, anti-US protests could sound as pro-Communist or pro-Soviet attitudes and statements. However, Mexico adhered voluntarily to the anti-Communist crusade the US President, Dwight Eisenhower, launched as soon as he took office (1952-1956).

The increasing influence of US culture was a matter of concern for Mexican elites. In 1947, Daniel Cosío Villegas, the liberal historian and political commentator, wrote that US’ influence crushed Mexico. It changed everything: food, fashion, political ideas, the language. It was like the Christian God: almighty and everywhere (Cosío Villegas, 1966, I: 202).

The growing influence of the Catholic Church was a reaction to the US cultural influence, but the Church also played a significant role of social control. Historically, it had been critical of the influence of the “American way of life”, of the liberal habits of women and of the frequency of divorce in US society. Nevertheless, after 1945 the Church and the US embassy met in the anti-Communist crusade, although there was a fundamental difference between anti-Communism in the US and anti-Communism in Mexico. The former’s emphasis was on civil liberties, by contrast, the latter was a patriotic defense of religion and the family.

The change in the position of the Catholic Church on the political stage had a decisive impact on Mexican society and domestic politics. The 1917 Constitution contained a number of anticlerical dispositions intended to subordinate the Church to State authority and to limit its influence on society (These dispositions were eliminated in 1991). In the years of revolutionary radicalism, the Church was persecuted and fought a three-year war against the State (1926-1929). However, when Mexico entered the Second World War, the Church responded to the government’s call for national unity and was incorporated into the post-revolutionary regime.

The presumed “Communist offensive” and the vigorous anti-Communist crusade of the Vatican inspired a religious revival. Catholic propaganda flooded Mexican homes. In violation of constitutional dispositions forbidding the political usage of religion and the clergy’s participation in politics by the 1940’s Church authorities became regular guests at official ceremonies. A number of Vatican representatives visited Mexico; closer ties developed between the Catholic Church in Mexico and US Catholics. The Archbishop of New York, Francis Cardinal Spellman, assumed the functions of Vicar of the Vatican in Latin America. The streets of Mexican cities provided the stage for religious celebrations. It was no secret that ecclesiastical authorities maintained constant exchanges with the President. In a 1955 interview with Time Magazine, Archbishop Luis María Martínez declared “Faith is stronger than law”, he added that the only thing missing was a constitutional reform.[3] (Time, 09/ May/ 1955).

The strength of conservatism did not result in the development of a strong Catholic party. The Catholic Church could be the center of an alternative to the PRI, but its relations with the State were so close and complex if undefined, that Catholic authorities would not risk a confrontation. Thus, in Mexico Catholics remained tied to an extreme traditionalism that preached depoliticization and adherence to the nationalist doctrine (Loaeza, 1988: 160-169). The close collaboration between Church and State hampered the development of an independent organization that would channel the institutional participation of right-wing sympathizers.

In this conservative setting, few objective elements justified the anti-Communist alarm. The relations between Mexico and the Soviet Union were rather poor. Mexico was the first Latin American country to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet regime in 1925, however, they were interrupted after the Comintern directed the Partido Comunista Mexicano, PCM, to undertake revolutionary actions against the Mexican government in 1930 (Cárdenas,1993; Spenser,1999). Relations were reestablished during the war. From then on Mexican Communists were consistently dependent on the “official left” represented by cardenismo and Lombardo Toledano.

The Mexican Revolution was the main obstacle to the development of Communism. The space this political force could have filled was taken by what was called revolutionary radicalism as practiced by President Cárdenas. During his term of office, the PCM followed the Popular Front strategy established by the Comintern, thus becoming a minor ally to the Partido Nacional Revolucionario, PNR, in power. The Central de Trabajadores de México, CTM, founded by Lombardo Toledano in 1936, virtually monopolized the control of workers’ organizations. According to documents in the Soviet archives, for the Soviet government Lombardo was the real leader of the Mexican working class.[4] US and British intelligence considered him a “dangerous” and powerful man, the number 1 Soviet agent in Latin America (Spenser, 2010). His political goals, his technique and the propaganda he disseminated were “identical” to those of “active Communist units”.[5]

The 1950’s was a difficult decade for Mexican Communists. The PCM agonized for lack of resources, but also because of the relentless persecution by the government against its members. Police forces raided regularly the party’s meetings and offices, and its leaders were incarcerated. The organization was further weakened by internal disputes and purges. According to a 1948 CIA report the number of card-carrying Communists in Mexico City was uncertain but not higher than one thousand.[6] In 1951 the party failed to gather the 30 thousand membership the law required, therefore, it lost official registration. In 1958 it had less than 5 thousand members in the whole of Mexico, whereas the CP in Argentina had 70 thousand members, in Brazil 50 thousand and in Cuba 12 thousand.[7] Mexican Communists depended on former President Cárdenas and Lombardo Toledano neither of which belonged to the party, however, both had direct access to the Soviet Communist party and to the Soviet government.

In the eyes of US intelligence agencies, Mexico was not an entirely reliable ally. First, the President, the PRI and union leaders made constant references to the Mexican revolution in an equivocal manner in the cold war context. Also, the line separating nationalism from anti-US statements and policies was tenuous. The main complaint the CIA had on Mexico’s anti-Communist battle concerned the role the country played as a meeting point for Communists from all Latin America and other countries.[8] In 1948, according to the agency’s report, the most important international Communist meetings outside the USSR were held in Mexico with delegates from Europe and Latin America in attendance. There they took decisions which “threatened the strategic interests of the United States.”[9] According to the report, the Mexican government did not help the Communists, nevertheless Mexico was “the main tactical area of Communism in the Western Hemisphere”.[10] (NACP, CIA, 1949). However, the authors of this report missed that by 1954 revolution in Mexico was a historical chapter not a political option.

Mexico in President Eisenhower’s Latin American Cold War policyTop

At first glance, the post-war international order appeared not to have significantly altered relations between countries in the hemisphere; it had simply consolidated the United States’ hegemony and accentuated the region’s relative isolation from the rest of the world. In 1945, the rule of the Monroe Doctrine was acknowledged as a legitimate reference for all countries in the continent —except Canada— at the 1945 Chapultepec Conference in Mexico City. The Act of Chapultepec consecrated the Doctrine on the assumption that anti-Communism was the cornerstone of a political identity shared by all nations in the Hemisphere.

Because of his military background Eisenhower’s foreign policy perspective was deeply influenced by geopolitical and strategic considerations. His view was embedded in the Monroe Doctrine.[17] Anticommunism took a predominant place in Eisenhower’s thinking. It led his administration to an “unabashed embrace of anti-Communist military dictatorships and its unwillingness to criticize, however mutedly, rampant political and civil repression in Latin America.” (Rabe, 1988: 40-41). At the same time, the acknowledgment of Latin America’s strategic importance did not make Eisenhower change his view regarding the economic development of the region. He firmly believed it should rely primarily on resources supplied by trade and private investment (Rabe, 1988: 66). Consequently, the Eximbank long-term lending was frozen, “the banks development loans in Latin America fell from 147 million in 1952 to 7.6 million in 1953.” (Rabe, 1988: 66).

Eisenhower’s policy towards Mexico was nuanced in that he would seek to understand this country’s needs before acting on uninformed assumptions, as it apparently happened in other countries. Guatemala seems to be an egregious example of this kind of policy-making. In this respect Mexico held a privileged position. Eisenhower would often ask the US ambassador directly for information about the Mexico’s internal situation by-passing the State Department. Thus, at this particular stage of the cold war, the Mexican government could use the US fear of Soviet expansion to its advantage. It leveraged the country’s geographical location within the North American security perimeter to ensure a different treatment to that given other countries in the region. This would be the basis for the “special relation” between the two countries. At the same time, the US-USSR rivalry hardened the restrictions on “the country’s freedom of political action” (Ojeda, 1974: 92). The deterioration of the relation between the superpowers, the intensification of international tensions and the threat of a nuclear war inhibited Mexico’s diplomatic activity.

The Mexican government adopted two strategies to cope with the power of the United States. First, it assimilated the main restrictions deriving from territorial contiguity, as if these limitations were self-imposed. For example, regarding international alliances Mexico knew it could never approach the Soviet Union. It also acknowledged that socialism was not an alternative for a country that was the neighbor and weak ally, of the most ferocious adversary of that ideology and political regime.[18] Secondly, the nationalist doctrine developed by the PRI included a commitment to democracy. As a result, anti-Communism took a prominent place in the official PRI doctrine. This addition turned out to be useful for the government that was seeking to weaken the cardenista coalition, many of whose members were identified as Communists.

At the time, democracy was understood as a long-term process. Washington accepted the Mexican regime as a “democracy in the making” the more praiseworthy because it was able to maintain political stability. Eisenhower repeatedly talked about his wish to foster cooperation with Mexico, which he considered different to other Latin American countries, simply because it shared with the US a border stretching more than 1 800 miles. This fact bore a special meaning for a military man, who was also fighting a war, of a fundamentally diplomatic and ideological nature, but one that could become an armed conflict at any moment. Under those conditions, it was clearly advisable to maintain good relations with a neighbor whose territory could be useful in the worst case scenario.[19]

In October 1953, when the preparations for the coup against Árbenz were gathering pace, the Presidents of Mexico and the United States met at the inauguration of the Falcon Dam on the border between Tamaulipas and Texas. In his welcoming speech, Eisenhower compared the two countries with two friends who shared “the kind of friendship that seeks–seeks earnestly and persistently to understand the viewpoint of the other, and then labor with sympathy and with all that is in the heart to meet the viewpoint of his friend.” (The New York Times, 20/ 10/ 1953). He offered Mexico help and talked about the country’s specific needs of technical assistance, educational opportunities and capital. Ruiz Cortines’ public response was a defense of general and abstract principles: he alluded to a threatened international peace. He also spoke of national sovereignty and self-determination as priority issues in the Mexican agenda, as if the ghost of intervention was flying over the friendly meeting.

The press reports suggest that President Eisenhower was speaking the language of cooperation, but the Mexican President seemed unimpressed. If the US President was indeed offering Mexico a program of economic aid, this meeting was a lost opportunity to give the US-Mexico relations a new direction and a wider scope. No meaningful dialog took place between the two Presidents. Instead parallel monologues prevailed. There was just one subject on which both agreed explicitly: the need to fight Communism and the preservation of Mexican political stability that Eisenhower was prepared to bolster.[20]

This political and ideological alliance was the foundation of an essentially cordial bilateral relation. In Secretary Dulles’ opinion a balance of expectations had been struck between Mexico and the US: “We know what to expect from Mexico and understand her limitations. The same is true of Mexico’s attitude towards the United States although it is traditionally colored by vague suspicion of our motives.”[21] John Foster Dulles’ views on Mexico seem surprisingly balanced and well-informed.[22] At this time of general paranoia, the Mexicans’ ambivalent attitudes and policies toward foreign Communists, or the government’s defense of State’s intervention, did not disturb the cordiality between the two countries. According to Dulles, Mexico could not see the seriousness of the Communist threat, because it had “a tradition of extreme liberalism.” He believed the Mexican Revolution had socialist tendencies, but that it was neither Marxist nor had a connection to the Soviets. Also, in his opinion, the PRI was committed to capitalism and he concluded “there is little doubt that in time of crisis Mexico would be on our side.” (FRUS, 1952-1954: 1351). John Foster Dulles’ analysis of the Mexican situation reveals surprising restraint.

Restlessness in Mexico: a Guatemalan legacy?Top

The three remaining years of Ruiz Cortines´ term of office, were a time of anxiety for the government. Students, workers and peasants protested, demonstrated on the streets, went on strike, occupied private farms, and attempted to organize independently from the PRI. Between 1955 and 1958 the number of strikes went from a 135 to 740; Rubén Jaramillo, an agrarian leader in the state of Morelos, led an armed group demanding land distribution. In 1956, students from the Instituto Politécnico Nacional, an institution created by President Cárdenas in 1937, challenged the government’s restrictive economic policies and went on strike. However, the army took control of the Institute’s buildings for a year until normality was restored. In 1958 members of the Communist party were elected to the railroad’s union leadership as well as to the leadership of the teacher’s union. Each of them attempted to break away from the PRI; however, their actions were shut down by the police, the leaders were arrested and remained in jail for several years. President Ruiz Cortines repeatedly reminded public opinion that he “would keep peace [throughout the country] at whatever price” (XLVIII Legislatura, 1966, IV: p.562).

At the same time, the Mexican President reinforced the PRI. In 1953 women’s right to vote was recognized. The party launched an ample affiliation campaign and by 1955, it announced that party membership had grown by three million. In the Presidential election of 1952 it won 2.7 million, but in the mid-term elections, the PRI received 90 per cent of the vote or 5.5 million votes. This figure indicates that according to the party’s calculations it captured the totality of new voters (Singer, 2010: 138-169).

In August 1955, the US ambassador to Mexico, Francis White wrote President Eisenhower a letter describing the excellent relation he had developed with the Mexican president since the Guatemalan crisis (FRUS, 1955-1957: 680). White reported that until then Ruiz Cortines had not been friendly with him, but after Arbenz’ fall, the President invited him to an informal conversation. Since that day his visits to the presidential residence at nightfall had become a weekly routine. It did not seem to cross White’s mind that this shift in attitude of the Mexican President might have been related to the fear provoked by the coup against Arbenz. Several Latin American governments and Ruiz Cortines’ among them thought the same could happen to them. According to White, the change was due to the “stable elements” of Mexican society —bankers, the chambers of industry and commerce, and segments of the middle classes— had reacted against the peso devaluation, but, most of all against the support for the Árbenz government. In his opinion the conservative opposition had been more influential than the left (Buchenau, 2004: 133).

White boasted of having convinced the Mexican President that Communism posed a genuine threat to Guatemala and Mexico. So much so, he continued, that Ruiz Cortines had proposed to further the cooperation between the two governments to fight Communism (FRUS, 1955-1957: 681). He also asked him to be discreet about their frequent exchanges. If they became public they could harm the government. Mexican public opinion was always distrustful of collaboration with the United States,[37] especially in security matters. Paradoxically, the Presidential request revealed a lack of trust in the US that escaped the Ambassador’s judgment.

The US may not have interfered directly in Mexican domestic affairs. However, it put an indirect pressure that was merely suggested. Presidents Eisenhower and Ruiz Cortines met for a third time in White Sulphur Springs on 26-27 March 1956. There Eisenhower made some suggestions to Ruiz Cortines. He told him that “subversion” and “Communist infiltration” were a matter of serious concern for the US people. He did not directly ask him to break up diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, but he warned the Mexican president that all Soviet embassies were “centers of espionage, sabotage and subversive activities.”[38] Ruiz Cortines agreed with his host on the need to reinforce the anti-Communist crusade. For Eisenhower this commitment seemed to be a necessary introduction to any conversation with his allies. After that they proceeded to discuss trade and issues related to bilateral cooperation.[39]

By 1957 Ruiz Cortines had learned how to deal with Eisenhower’s obsession with Soviet expansion and the dissemination of Communism. He understood that Anti-Communism guided the US President’s perception of the world and of his responsibilities as leader of the free world. Anti-Communism provided also the standard by which he measured the loyalty of his country’s allies. Ruiz Cortines understood that he could use the US President’s concerns in Mexico’s benefit. In the conversation the Mexican President had with the new US ambassador, Robert C.Hill, he thanked him for keeping their meetings confidential and for respecting Mexico’s self-determination. Ruiz Cortines stressed the importance of non-interference by external powers in the presidential succession.

That day the last part of the conversation was dedicated to a description of Adolfo López Mateos’virtues. He was the PRI candidate for the presidency and his campaign had just started. Ruiz Cortines wanted to give the US government all reassurances that he and his successor were alike. He said: “He is exactly like me.” “He knows how to treat Communists”, “As I do”, he added sibylline.[40]

EPILOGUETop

As the presidential succession in 1958 approached, President Ruiz Cortines decided to offset the destabilizing effect of political discrepancies within society. The first step in that direction was to concentrate in his hands the decision regarding the PRI presidential candidate. López Mateos´candidacy was not the result of a negotiation among relevant political actors. He was chosen by Ruiz Cortines alone, who put in display all Presidential power. Secondly, he concentrated all his political energies in the building of an ample coalition comprising all those who identified with the Mexican Revolution, left and right. As a result López Mateos had the backing of Lombardo’s Partido Popular Socialista, PPS, and of the retiree military members of Partido Auténtico de la Revolución Mexicana, PARM. Ruiz Cortines wanted López Mateos to represent revolutionary unity. Therefore, in July 1958 the PRI-PPS-PARM candidate —candidate of all revolutionaries—, Adolfo López Mateos, had only one competitor —Luis Alvarez— the PAN candidate, who represented the adversaries of the Mexican Revolution. The 1958 election was the first one since 1940 that did not split the political elite. Nevertheless, rather than expressing agreement, the election showed the government’s growing intolerance of dissent, and the weak institutional representation of political differences.

To what extent was this particular development in Mexican domestic politics a result of the cold war context? The answer to this question suggests that the political status quo in each Latin American country was connected to the regional order. The comparison between the Guatemalan experience of 1954 and the Cuban revolution a decade later indicates that the hemispheric order also contributed to sustain national political systems.

In a stable regional order, such as that prevailing in Latin America in 1954, domestic reforms were neither threatening to that order or to US hegemony, nor could they go very far. Whereas the transformation of the environment brought about by the instability of US-Soviet relations in 1961-1962, produced the setting of a Communist regime in Cuba and destabilized almost every other country in the region. This means that while national political systems are sensitive to changes in the external context, changes in the domestic context do not necessarily affect the regional order. However, for President Eisenhower and his Secretary of State, John F. Dulles, the preservation of the internal status quo —even if it was undemocratic— in Latin American countries was a condition for the continuity of the regional order. From their perspective the durability of these political systems was of strategic interest for the US. However, history proved them wrong, because the disruption of the regional order caused by US intervention overturned the internal order of things.