The Mexican political fracture and the 1954 coup in Guatemala (The beginnings of the cold war in Latin America)

Abstract

This article challenges two general assumptions that have guided the study of Mexican foreign policy in the last four decades. First, that from this policy emerges national consensus; and, secondly that between Mexico and the US there is a “special relation” thanks to which Mexico has been able to develop an autonomous foreign policy. The two assumptions are discussed in light of the impact on Mexican domestic politics of the 1954 USsponsored military coup against the government of government of Guatemala. In Mexico, the US intervention reopened a political fracture that had first appeared in the 1930’s, as a result of President Cárdenas’radical policies that divided Mexican society. These divisions were barely dissimulated by the nationalist doctrine adopted by the government. The Guatemalan Crisis brought some of them into the open. The Mexican President, Adolfo Ruiz Cortines’ priority was the preservation of political stability. He feared the US government might feel the need to intervene in Mexico to prevent a serious disruption of the status quo. Thus, Ruiz Cortines found himself in a delicate position in which he had to solve the conflicts derived from a divided elite and a fractured society, all this under the pressure of US’ expectations regarding a secure southern border.